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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
The question posed to this Court is the abstract legal issue of how the district court can

determine whether the public defense system the State has created and improved-through
legislation, rulemaking, enforcement, and appropriations of $28,613,300 1 since 2016-is
violating the constitutional rights of indigent defendants across the state. This case is and always
has been a question of whether "Idaho's public defense system violates the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Tucker
v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 16 (2017) ("Tucker I"). The framework provided in this appeal will aid

the district court, which requested guidance, in determining whether the State and the Public
Defense Commission ("PDC") have created a system that provides sufficient funding and
standards to further the provision of constitutionally-adequate representation.
The correct standard is the standard that is consistent with this Court's prior ruling and the
allegations in the Complaint that, if proven, met the injury requirement and gave Plaintiffs
standing in Tucker I. That is: "[Plaintiffs] satisfy the injury in fact standard because the complaint
alleged actual and constructive denials of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution." Tucker I,
162 Idaho at 20. Plaintiffs' proposed standard runs from any factual support of actual and
constructive denials of counsel.

But, the correct standard should fairly ferret out whether

1

See HB 609, 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws 850; SB 1159, 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws 507; SB 1346, 2018
Idaho Sess. Laws 576; SB 1158, 2019 Idaho Sess. Laws 368, R. at2645-2652. Of that $28 million,
$25,703,600 has been appropriated for trustee and benefits payments, which provides financial
assistance to the counties and funding for the extraordinary litigation fund. The other
appropriated monies account for personnel costs and overhead. Id.

1

Plaintiffs' claims are true: are indigent defendants statewide suffering widespread actual or
constructive denials of counsel due to systemic deficiencies?
This case comes to this Court in an unusual procedural posture via a sua sponte appeal by
the district court on a purely legal issue in a case that was completely factually developed through
motion practice in advance of trial. Given that this case is an action that seeks only declaratory
and prospective injunctive relief, the evidence presented to the district court in late 2018 and early
2019 is already stale and outdated. While Plaintiffs rely on that stale evidence and use it to paint
a picture of a stark constitutional crisis that is untethered to reality, this appeal is not about
evidence and the weighing of evidence; it is about what standard should apply and the burdens of
the respective parties. While the State and the PDC do not believe it is appropriate to rehash the
evidence2 that was provided to the district court prior to denying summary judgment, bringing
some evidence into the analysis could be helpful in determining the appropriate framework.

B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
1.

Statutory Background and History of the PDC

In 2007, Idaho commissioned a review of Idaho's trial level indigent defense services and
in 2009, following the formation of the Public Defense Subcommittee, Idaho contracted with the
National Legal Aid & Defender Association ("NLADA") to conduct that study. R. at 2560-62. 3
In January 2010, NLADA issued a report that was highly critical of trial-level indigent defense
services in the State of Idaho and proposed that the State consider the "two primary factors that
determine the adequacy of indigent defense services . . . (a) the degree and sufficiency of state

2

Apparently Plaintiffs feel differently given the vast amount of pages they spend discussing their
evidence in the opening brief. See Appellants' Br. at 4-14.
3
This brief uses "R." to refer to the limited clerk's record prepared for this appeal. References to
the clerk's record from the prior appeal in 2016 are designated "2016 R."
2

funding and structure, and (b) compliance with nationally recognized standards of justice. So
long as these two goals are met, the Idaho policy-makers will have remedied the crisis." R. at
2612 (emphasis added). 4
In 2013, the Public Defense Subcommittee recommended the formation of the PDC and
in 2014, the legislature adopted that recommendation. R. at 2612. Upon first creation, "the PDC
had three mandatory duties: (1) promulgating certain rules; (2) making legislative
recommendations; and (3) holding quarterly meetings." R. at 2612 (citing Tucker I, 162 Idaho at
24). In 2016, the legislature increased the PDC's rulemaking authority and also increased its
funding from $304,300 to $5,796, 900. R. at 2612-13. In both 2017 and 2018, the legislature
continued to appropriate over $5,800,000 to the PDC, and in 2019, the appropriation amount was
increased to $11,498,000. 5 R. at 2613; SB 1158, 2019 Idaho Sess. Laws 368. In fiscal year 2021,
the PDC has requested $11,273,900. 6 Since the NLADA report was issued, State and county
spending on indigent defense has more than tripled. 7 R. at 2561, 3871. (Appendix 1 provides a
visual overview of the history of the PDC, including rulemaking, statutory changes, and
appropriations to improve public defense, including the 2020 updates).

4

The full NLAD A report can be found at:
https ://www .nlada.net/sites/default/files/id guaranteeofcounsel jseri0 1-2010 report.pdf.
5
The dramatic increase in 2019 was partially attributed to the implementation ofldaho' s caseload
requirement for public defenders so that financial assistance would be available to counties to
hire additional public defenders in order to be in compliance by the effective date of March 2020.
R. 2614-17.
6
See minutes of Joint Finance-Appropriation Committee, January 28, 2020, available at:
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/standingcommittees/200128 jfac 0800AM-Minutes.pdf.
7
Per capita spending on indigent defense by the counties in 2010 was just $7.00 with $0.00
contributed by the State. At summary judgment, combined county and State spending was over
$21.00 per capita. Today, the State alone, not taking into account county spending, contributes
$5.00 to indigent defense for every Idahoan.
3

2.

The Tucker I Appeal and Arguments Made During the Tucker I Proceedings

This case was filed in 2015 where Plaintiffs "constitute a putative class of criminal
defendants who seek to challenge Idaho's public defense system." Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 16.
The Complaint was dismissed by the district court on the grounds that the "claims were not
justiciable on standing, ripeness, and separation of powers grounds." Id. The Tucker I appeal
was focused on whether Plaintiffs had alleged justiciable claims. Id. For purposes of this appeal,
only standing will be addressed because it is the only issue related to justiciability that is now
called into question by Plaintiffs' arguments and proposed new standard.
In Tucker I, this Court disagreed with the district court's justiciability determination and
reversed, in part, and remanded, dismissing only the claims against the Governor. Tucker I, 162
Idaho at 21-23. As to the State and the PDC, the Tucker I Court found that "[a]lleg[ations of]
systemic inadequacies in a public defense system results in actual or constructive denials of
counsel at critical stages of the prosecution suffices to show an injury in fact to establish standing
in a suit for deprivation of constitutional rights." Id. at 20. The Tucker I Court further found that
these alleged harms were causally linked and subject to redressability by the State and PDC. 8 Id.
at 21-26. In analyzing Plaintiffs' Complaint in Tucker I, the Court stated that "[i]n order to have
standing to seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of repeated injury of
future harm to the plaintiff in the absence of the injunction." Id. at 19. Under the traditional
standing analysis, this includes (1) injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and
conduct; and (3) redressability.

8

Of significant note, however, redressability as to the PDC was limited to its rulemaking duties
and whether those had been satisfied. "Appellants allege their injuries are caused, in part, by the
PDC' s failure to promulgate rules. Were the PDC to exercise these powers, it would create a
substantial likelihood of remedying the injuries alleged. As such, redressability is satisfied as to
the PDC." Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 26.
4

To satisfy the injury-in-fact prong and revive the dismissed claims in Tucker I, Plaintiffs
relied heavily on their allegations that deficiencies in Idaho's public defense system were causing
widespread actual and constructive denials of counsel to indigent defendants across the state:
Due to ... systemic statewide deficiencies, Plaintiffs and the proposed class they
represent have suffered the consequences of actual denial of counsel at critical
stages of their criminal proceedings, as well as constructive denial of counsel ...
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
2016 Appellants' Br. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate harm in three ways: (1) pleading guilty due to
inadequate representation, resulting in conviction; (2) actual denial of counsel at
critical stages; and (3) constructive denial of counsel throughout their cases due
to additional systemic deficiencies with Idaho's statewide indigent defense
system.

Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged longstanding, statewide deficiencies
in the Idaho System, which result in actual and constructive denial of counsel
across the state.

Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
[T]housands of indigent defendants across the state - including the named
plaintiffs - continue to receive constitutionally-deficient representation as a
result of Idaho's broken system. It is incumbent upon the courts to step in and
ensure the State addresses these ongoing injuries.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent have suffered and will continue to
suffer very real injuries - including prolonged pretrial detention, inability to
communicate effectively with counsel, and lack of investigation of their cases - as
a result of the actual and constructive denial of counsel that remains ongoing in
Idaho's courts . . . .
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs also contended in Tucker I what the appropriate standard of proof should be for
their claims at the merits stage. The standard Plaintiffs proposed in Tucker I required proof of
actual harm, which is in distinct contrast to their newly developed, vague risk of potential future

5

harm. 9 Plaintiffs quoted Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 136 n.24 (Mich. App. 2009), 10 for the
standard that a Michigan court set for a systemic denial of the right to counsel claim: "a finding
of widespread and systemic instances of deprivation of counsel and deficient performance
resulting from a flawed ... system." 2016 Appellants' Reply Br. at 8 (internal quotations omitted).
And Plaintiffs acknowledged that the linchpin of their case would be their ability to prove their
allegations that indigent defendants across the state are suffering actual and constructive denials
of counsel that were caused by the State or PDC:
If Plaintiffs prove at summary judgment or trial that there are ongoing violations
of the right to counsel in Idaho, and that those violations are due to systemic,
statewide failures that the counties cannot remedy, then this Court or the district
court can order the Governor 11 to take action
Id. at 20 (emphasis added) (footnote added).

This Court relied heavily on Plaintiffs' allegations of actual injury in Tucker I and rejected
Plaintiffs' argument that they need not prove injury under the "relaxed standing" standard. Under
"relaxed standing" a plaintiff does not necessarily need to prove actual injury because "no party
could otherwise have standing to bring a claim." Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 26 (internal quotations
omitted). In addressing relaxed standing, the Court noted that Plaintiffs' allegations, if proven,
demonstrated injury to "thousands of indigent defendants" in the state who are suffering similar

9

Significantly, the word "risk" appears only twice in Plaintiffs' 2016 briefing on appeal. 2016
Appellants' Br. at 31-3 2 ("The even graver risk here - one that actually happened to the lead
plaintiff in this case - is that ongoing denial of counsel, especially to a criminal defendant
awaiting trial in jail, will effectively coerce a guilty plea."); 2016 Appellants' Reply Br. at 6 ("Any
criminal defendant aggrieved would have to risk criminal conviction and imprisonment, and raise
claims pro se, as defenses in a criminal case, even if it meant having to do so from prison.").
Contrast that with the 71 times it is used, not including headings, in Appellants' Brief here.
10
Rev'd on other grounds (784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) and affirmed on reconsideration 866
N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2010).
11
While this section only discusses the Governor and redressability of claims with him as a named
party, the point holds true that the crux of their argument was whether or not they could prove
widespread systemic denials of counsel - either actually or constructively.
6

injuries, reasoning that "any one of those 'thousands of indigent defendants' could bring this
lawsuit[.]" Id. at 26-27.
a.

The Tucker I Court Found Justiciable Claims Against the State and PDC
for the Injury Prong Under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)

In finding injury for standing purposes, the Court relied on Plaintiffs' allegations and
argument, and on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Ramsey v. State, 159 Idaho
887 (Ct. App. 2015), to hold that Plaintiffs had adequately alleged "actual and constructive denials
of counsel." Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20. It further noted that Plaintiffs' claims were justiciable
because Plaintiffs did "not allege deficiencies in just a handful of counties. Rather, they allege
'longstanding, statewide deficiencies in the Idaho system, which result in actual and constructive
denial of counsel across the state."' Id. at 25 (quoting Appellants' Br.). The Court analyzed
allegations about the named Plaintiffs' experiences under Cronic to determine that Plaintiffs had
adequately alleged that the named Plaintiffs suffered Cronic-based actual denials of counsel and
constructive denials of counsel based on factors specific to their individual cases. Id. at 20-21.
b.

The Tucker I Court Found Justiciable Claims Against the PDC Based on
its Limited Statutory Authority

The Court permitted Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims against the PDC members, but
noted that the scope of those claims was much narrower than the scope of the claims against the
State because the PDC's causal connection resulted solely from "its duty to promulgate rules
governing training and caseload reporting requirements." Id. at 24. The Court determined that
the "PDC' s failure to promulgate these rules" was the sole basis for viable claims against the PDC
members. Id. The Court further noted that "[i]fthe PDC were to take action" to promulgate rules,
Plaintiffs' "claims against the PDC may fail for either mootness or lack of proof." Id. at 28 n.9.

7

Given that the PDC has now taken action and fulfilled its statutory obligation to promulgate rules,
it is unclear why the individual members of the PDC are still defendants in this case. 12
3.

On Remand, Plaintiffs File Their Amended Complaint Adding a Vague "Risk of
Harm" Theory and Seek Class Certification

On remand from the Tucker I decision, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Class Action
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Supplemental Pleading on August 15, 2017
("Amended Complaint"), which alleged similar allegations as contained in their initial Complaint,
but added no new claims for relief. R. at 142-207. Plaintiffs' claims, however, did add a new
component that was not within their initial Complaint. That new component is the center of this
appeal because it mirrors Plaintiffs' proposed standard here. It is as follows:
The State has violated [the class members' constitutional rights] 13 because it has
failed to ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and
effective legal representation at all critical stages of their cases, including at initial
appearances, resulting in the actual and constructive denial of counsel, because, in
light of their crushing workloads, lack of resources, and limited time, public
defenders in Idaho are continually laboring under an actual conflict of interest,
since their efforts to represent one indigent client are necessarily carried out at the
expense of others; because the State's public defense system poses a significant
risk that indigent defendants will be prejudiced, that their appointed attorneys
will be unable to meet their professional responsibilities, and that their
attorneys' representation of them will be materially limited by those attorneys'
responsibilities to other clients; and because the State has interfered with the
ability of counsel to render effective assistance to indigent accused.
R. at 201-04 ,r,r 183, 186, 190, 193 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs used their allegations that class members were suffering actual and constructive
denials of counsel - not a mere risk of harm - to obtain statewide certification of a class of all

12

At summary judgment, the State and the PDC argued that at a minimum, the PDC members
should be dismissed as parties. R. at 2567-72.
13
The constitutional rights are as follows: (1) the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution (right to
counsel); (3) the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
and (4) Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution (due process).
8

indigent defendants.

Plaintiffs noted that one of the common questions that needed to be

answered in this case, and justifying class certification, is "[w ]hether the State is currently
providing constitutionally sufficient representation for indigent defendants in their respective
jurisdictions." R. at 226. When Defendants objected that class certification was improper based
on mere allegations that indigent defendants across the State were suffering actual and
constructive denials of counsel, the district court disagreed and indicated that proof that class
members were suffering actual and constructive denial of counsel would come at the merits stage.
Tr., Vol. I, 18:5-20:4. 14 The district court specifically relied on Plaintiffs' allegations that class
members were suffering actual and constructive denials of counsel in granting class certification.
R. at 900 & n.3. Class certification was granted on January 17, 2018. R. at 899-924.

4.

At Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Retreat from Cronic and Instead Rely Only on
the in Vague "Risk of Harm" Theory

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. R. at 2166-68; 2541-43. The
State and the PDC relied on the standards this Court established in Tucker I and Plaintiffs'
allegations from the Amended Complaint. The State and the PDC established that the PDC had
done not only what the Court had said could moot the claims-promulgated rules within its
statutory authority-but also had gone much further to improve public defense by requesting
additional and increased funding. See, e.g., R. at 2567-72 (summarizing the PDC's extensive
rulemaking to improve public defense). And they demonstrated that Plaintiffs could not prove
their allegations that indigent defendants across the State were suffering actual and constructive

14

When Defendants pointed out that there was no evidence in the record to establish public
defense conditions in the "vast majority of Idaho's counties, the district court indicated that
evidence would be evaluated at the merits stage: "Well, that's a merit determination that would
come assuming there would be a class certification and a trial on the merits .... " Tr., Vol. I,
19: 12-15.
9

denial of counsel. See, e.g., R. at 2630-32 (summarizing public defender testimony unanimously
refuting Plaintiffs' claims), 25 72-92 (detailing lack of proof and/or legal authority for claims).
Plaintiffs then abandoned their prior allegations of widespread actual and constructive
denials of the right to counsel and argued that Tucker I stood for the proposition that they need
not prove by way of evidence that any class members were suffering any harm. 15 Instead,
Plaintiffs advanced a new, much more subjective theory, which is the same theory that they argue
here on appeal; that is, that the Constitution guarantees indigent defendants the right to a risk-free
public defense system. See R. 5119-5120. The State and the PDC argued that Plaintiffs were
required to prove what they had alleged all along: that is, that the State and the PDC were
responsible for systemic deficiencies that were causing actual harm, i.e., causing indigent
defendants across the State to suffer actual or constructive denials of counsel. See, e.g., R. at
2565-66.
The State and the PDC contested all Plaintiffs' evidence as factually false or addressed by
statutes 16 and rules as follows:
•

That the system overburdens most defenders. See Idaho Code § l 9850( 1)(a)(vii)(3 ); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.01, 61.01.08.004.02 - Standard III; see
also R. at 2579-82, 3893-97.

•

That the system permits undue political and judicial influence. See Idaho Code §§
19-850(1)(a)(vii)(l), 31-2604(3); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.01, 61.01.08.004.02 Standard I; see also R. at 2590-91, 3897-99.

15

It can only be presumed that Plaintiffs were conflating the Court's comments related to the
Strickland analysis of individual class member results with the analysis under Cronic, requiring
proof of an actual or constructive denial of counsel. This is clearly a mistake that continues into
Plaintiffs' briefing in this appeal.
16
The State and PDC have repeatedly argued one cannot challenge the constitutionality of the
"system" when the underlying statutes that establish that "system" remain unchallenged. R. 256769, 3889-92.
10

5.

•

That the system financially incentivizes ineffective representation. See Idaho Code
§§ 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(4), 19-859(4); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.01, 61.01.08.004.02 Standard IV; Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 24-25, n.7; see also R. at 2589-90, 3899-3901.

•

That the system lacks sufficient training and supervision. See Idaho Code § 19850( 1)(a)(vii)( 5); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.02 - Standard V; see also R. at 2591-92,
3903-04.

•

That the system does not ensure adequate access to and use of investigation and
expert resources. See Idaho Code§ 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(7); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.02
- Standard VII; Idaho R. Crim. P. 12.2; see also R. at 2583-85, 3901-03.

•

That the system fails to ensure representation in many initial appearances in Idaho.
See Idaho Code §§ 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(6), 19-854(1); IDAPA 61.01.08.004.02 Standard VI(A), (B); Idaho R. Crim. P. 5, Idaho Misdemeanor Crim. R. 14; see
also R. at 2575-78, 3904-08.

•

That the PDC has demonstrated that it is unable to fix Idaho's broken system. See
R. at 3889-92.
The District Court Seeks Guidance From This Court

The district court was understandably perplexed by the change in theories of this case and
the conflict in the parties' respective positions. R. at 5 54 7-48 & n.1 ("Plaintiffs contend they
need only prove a risk of harm, whereas Defendants assert Plaintiffs must demonstrate actual
harm to prevail on their claims."). With trial scheduled to begin on April 22, 2019, the district
court denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment and identified questions it could
not answer for purposes of trial without further guidance from this Court, including: whether the
named Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they suffered some or all of the alleged harms; whether
the harm is widespread or actually occurring in all the counties in Idaho; whether Plaintiffs have
to show that the State and the PDC are the cause of all the deficiencies; or whether, on balance,
the identified deficiencies merely create a risk that indigent defendants' constitutional rights are
being or will be violated. R. at 5564, 5574-75. The district court sought permission to appeal to
this Court with the following question: "what is the appropriate legal standard the class of
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Plaintiffs must meet in order to prevail on their systemic challenge to Idaho's indigent public
defense system?" R. at 5574. This Court accepted that appeal on the issues listed below.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1)

What is the standard to be used in a lawsuit challenging the public defense system
for the state of Idaho?

(2)

What is the burden of the respective parties going forward?

(3)

Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Litke v. Munkhojf, 163 Idaho 627,
632 (2018). "An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not itself an appealable order."
Verity v. USA Today, 164 Idaho 832, 841 (2019). "Because a permissive appeal under I.A.R. 12

from a denial of a motion for summary judgment leads to such an unusual posture, this Court
must 'rule narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by the motion and
answered by the trial court."' Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 863 (2011) (citing
Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785 (2009)). "[T]he intent ofl.A.R. 12 [is] to provide

an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest
or legal questions of first impression are involved." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 789 (internal quotation
marks omitted). "After this Court accepts a permissive appeal, the case proceeds as if it were an
appeal as a matter of right, unless otherwise ordered by this Court." Miller, 150 Idaho at 863
(citing Idaho App. R. 12(d)).
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IV.
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
The State and PDC do not seek attorneys' fees on appeal and they oppose an award of
attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs. The only issues in this appeal are the standard governing Plaintiffs'
claims and the parties' burdens-issues that were raised sua sponte by the district court prior to
reaching the merits. R. at 5592. Regardless of which proposed standard or articulation of the
parties' burdens is adopted, this appeal will not result in a decision on the merits. See Tucker I,
162 Idaho at 30 (rejecting Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees because the "merits" of their claims
"still need to be addressed"). It would be unreasonable to award attorneys' fees to either party in
an appeal that neither party requested on an issue raised by the district court seeking guidance on
a question of law about the standard governing Plaintiffs' claims.
V.
ARGUMENT
Requiring Plaintiffs to prove statewide deficiencies in the Idaho system, which result in
actual and constructive denial of counsel across the state, is consistent with the allegations
Plaintiffs themselves have used to argue standing in this case. In their opening brief on this
appeal, Plaintiffs ask this Court to create a new standard, one that does not require them to prove
their allegations of statewide actual and constructive denial of counsel. Instead, Plaintiffs propose
an abstract standard that would require them to argue merely that Idaho's public defense system
poses unquantifiable risks that Cronic-based actual and constructive denials of counsel might
occur at some unknown time in the future to some unknown indigent defendant. And because
Plaintiffs cannot prove their allegations that indigent defendants are suffering actual, ongoing
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harm, they suggest that evidence about real public defenders' working conditions and the services
they are providing to their clients is irrelevant:
Though the circumstances surrounding particular cases or the conduct of specific
defenders may or may not epitomize the effects of structural deficiencies, such
evidence is not the most probative of flaws in the system itself. Rather, in
determining the merits of Plaintiffs' case, the Court will best be served by
evaluating the reports, assessments, applications, contracts, deposition and expert
testimony, and other evidence of systemic deficiencies within the system.
Appellants' Br. at 28. 17 In other words, under Plaintiffs' new theory, expert testimony about
"systemic deficiencies within the system," is more probative than direct evidence about whether
the system is actually providing constitutionally adequate representation to the class of indigent
defendants. 18
To match the limited evidence they gathered, Plaintiffs assert that the most logical and
practical standard should be:
To Obtain Prospective Relief, Plaintiffs Must Show That Idaho's Public Defense
System Presents a Substantial Risk to Class Members of Future Sixth Amendment
Violations.
Appellants' Br. at 16. However, the correct standard should be:
To Establish Their Claims Against the State, Plaintiffs Must Prove, by a
Preponderance of Evidence, that the State is Responsible for Inadequacies in

17

Since Plaintiffs raise the question of what evidence is most probative, their evidence of "reports,
assessments, applications, contracts, deposition and expert testimony" should be contrasted with
the evidence provided by the State and the PDC at summary judgment, which consisted of
testimony from (1) the eight currently appointed members of the PDC; (2) 20 public defenders
representing all seven judicial districts; (3) four county commissioners; (4) five members of the
PDC staff, including two different executive directors; and (5) expert testimony. R. at 2630-53,
3014-17,3132-61,3393-3400,3426-33,3445-52,3506-13,3554-61,3581-87,3588-3602,361738, 3648-54, 3774-80, 3790-96, 3807-13, 3855-61.
18
Defendants dispute the bulk of Plaintiffs' conclusory and unsupported "Statement of Relevant
Facts." Defendants pointed out in great detail below the numerous flaws in these alleged facts.
See generally R. at 3914-53 (Defs.' Jt. Resp. to Pls.' Statement of Material Facts on Summ. J.),
3954-64 (Defs.' Jt. Objections to Pls.' Proffered Summ. J. Evid.). But because these disputed
"facts" have little, if any, relevance to the limited issues in this appeal, Defendants will not burden
the Court with the bases for these disputes.
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Idaho's Public Defense System that Have Caused the Named Plaintiffs, and Are
Causing Class Members Across the State, to Suffer an Actual or Constructive
Denial of Counsel as Defined in Cronic.
To Establish Their Claims Against the PDC, Plaintiffs Must Prove, By a
Preponderance of Evidence, that the PDC Has Failed to Take Action Within Its
Statutory Authority, and that Failure Has Caused the Named Plaintiffs, and Is
Causing Class Members Across the State, to Suffer an Actual or Constructive
Denial of Counsel as Defined in Cronic.
While Defendants appreciate that Plaintiffs take pride in the development of their factual
record below, relying on their "most probative" evidence and developing a standard derived from
that evidence is a results-oriented distraction that this Court should reject. The evidence provided
to the district court does serve as an example to demonstrate how the respective standards would
apply; however, starting from the evidence and working back to the standard does not create good,
lasting or consistent law that is capable of being applied uniformly and consistently. Instead, this
Court should consider basic rules of justiciability, the pleadings that gave Plaintiffs standing to
proceed in the first instance, and legally what makes sense for Idaho in setting the standard that
should be applied to evaluate Idaho's public defense system.
1.

The Parties Agree on One Thing: Strickland v. Washington is Irrelevant to the
Court's Consideration on the Standard to be Applied

Plaintiffs appear to conflate the State and PDC's statements that "some form of harm must
be proven" with a requirement that a Strickland-analysis occur. However, that is not the case.
The State and the PDC merely want Plaintiffs to prove the harm they alleged that is ongoing and
being suffered by "hundreds, if not thousands" of indigent defendants across the State-i.e.,
actual or constructive denials of counsel under Cronic.
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs accuse the State of attempting to "devalue this important
class action seeking prospective, system-wide relief from structural deficiencies by warping it
into a chain of hundreds of individual, Strickland-like ineffective assistance of counsel analyses."
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Appellants' Br. at 28. In fact most of Plaintiffs' legal analysis is based on the false premise that
the State is trying to force them to prove on a case-by-case basis that thousands of people in Idaho
have had the outcome of their proceeding prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, the State and the PDC are well aware that "Strickland .. .is inapplicable when systemic
deficiencies in the provision of public defense are at issue." Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 19.
The State and PDC's position is simple and has been consistent: Plaintiffs must prove the
claim that gave rise to standing. That is, that statewide, indigent defendants are suffering Cronic
violations due to the structure ofldaho' s indigent defense system. Not once in summary judgment
briefing or argument has the State or PDC argued that Strickland-harm is required for Plaintiffs
to prove their case. It has been settled since April 28, 2017 that "[t]he issues raised in this case
do not implicate Strickland." Id.
2.

Cronic is the Appropriate Standard in this Case as it Relates to "Harm"

Instead of Strickland, the "harm" referenced by the State and PDC is the "concrete and
particularized" and "actual and imminent" harm alleged in the Complaint under Cronic. See

Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20-21; see also 2016 Appellants' Br. at 9 ("Under Cronic, Plaintiffs have
standing to bring their claims, all of which are ripe and appropriate for judicial review under the
separation of powers doctrine.").
In Cronic, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel can be violated by actual nonrepresentation or constructive nonrepresentation. Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 n.3 (2002) (discussing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59). Three situations
qualify as either an actual or constructive denial of counsel. The first is the absence, or "complete
denial[,]" of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding. Id., 535 U.S. at 695 (quoting Cronic,
466 U.S. at 658-59). The second is when defense counsel "entirely fails" to subject a case to
"meaningful adversarial testing." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-660. The third is when counsel is
16

available, but circumstances are such that there is a small likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance. Id.
As outlined above, this Court has already defined the justiciable harm in this case by
applying Cronic to Plaintiffs' allegations that failures in Idaho's indigent defense system have
resulted in "actual and constructive denials of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution"
suffered by both the named Plaintiffs and "thousands of indigent defendants across the state[.]"
Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20, 27. Thus, it follows that in order to prevail at trial, Plaintiffs must

prove that systemic deficiencies are causing one or more of the three Cronic scenarios across the
State, and that those deficiencies exist because of some action or inaction by the State or PDC.
Complying with this standard does not require a case-by-case analysis of whether ineffective
assistance prejudiced the outcome of any criminal case as Strickland would require. But it does
require Plaintiffs to actually prove what they have alleged: class members across the State are
suffering actual or constructive denials of counsel even if that denial would not change the
outcome of the underlying criminal proceedings.
3.

The Correct Standard Requires that Plaintiffs Prove What They Have Alleged

Plaintiffs' proposed standard on appeal-and to the district court at summary judgmentis inconsistent with their pleadings and seeks a burden of proof that falls far short of proving the
factual allegations contained within their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs define their claim as
one of a "structural deprivation of constitutional rights." Appellants' Br. at 3. That awkward
phrase-"structural deprivation of constitutional rights"-appears nowhere in the Amended
Complaint.

What does appear in the Amended Complaint, repeatedly, are allegations that

"[ e]very day, hundreds, if not thousands" of indigent defendants across the state are presently
suffering an actual or constructive denial of their personal right to counsel:
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[P]ublic defenders are not able to provide the zealous representation
constitutionally required of them in all of their cases.
The funding, oversight, and training that the State has provided since this lawsuit
was filed has been inadequate to remedy the systemic actual and constructive
denial of counsel that has continued at least since the 2010 NLADA report and the
filing of this lawsuit in 2015.
[N]o county in Idaho is currently providing indigent defense services that meet
state or federal legal standards.
All of the above-mentioned issues have combined to cause tremendous harm to
Plaintiffs and to the Class as a whole.
The State of Idaho has violated the Sixth Amendment because it has failed to
ensure that all indigent criminal defendants receive meaningful and effective legal
representation at all critical stages of their cases, including at initial appearances,
resulting in the actual and constructive denial of counsel.
R. at 152, 164, 181, 197, 201-204, ,r,r 12, 47, 110, 167, 183, 186, 190, 193 (emphasis added).
The correct result here is to have Plaintiffs prove what they have alleged-that
inadequacies in Idaho's public defense system have caused the named Plaintiffs, and are currently
causing class members across the state, to suffer an actual or constructive denial of counsel.
4.

Plaintiffs' Position at Summary Judgment and on Appeal Calls Into Question
Whether They Continue to Have Standing

This Court's opinion in Tucker I establishes the bare minimum Plaintiffs must prove to
establish their claims. Although the Court's opinion dealt with the issue of standing, and not
necessarily all the elements required to prove a claim, to succeed on the merits, Plaintiffs
necessarily must be able to prove at least the allegations on which this Court relied to determine
whether Plaintiffs had standing to proceed. "[W]hen standing is challenged, mere allegations are
not sufficient, and the party invoking [a] court's jurisdiction must demonstrate facts supporting"
the allegations that form the basis for standing. State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 882
(2015).
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Because standing is not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable
part of the plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any
other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. At
summary judgment the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but
must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts

Camp Easton Forever, Inc. v. Inland NW Council Boy Scouts ofAm., 156 Idaho 893, 898 (2014)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
If the rule were otherwise, any party could manufacture standing by simply making false
allegations to get past the pleading stage.
The State and PDC have challenged the accuracy of the allegations Plaintiffs used to
establish standing at the pleading stage. Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits without proving
the allegations; they must prove that statewide deficiencies are causing actual and constructive
denial of counsel across the state.
Plaintiffs suggest that the Court's opinion in Tucker I supports their "risky system" theory,
but their suggestion lacks merit. Plaintiffs employ misleading and incomplete quotations from
the Tucker I opinion in order to make it appear as if the law of this case supports their proposed
standard. It does not. In support of the idea that Plaintiffs need only prove a risky public defense
system, Plaintiffs characterize this Court's prior decision as follows:
This Court explained that ... "systemic inadequacies in a public defense system"
can serve as the basis for Plaintiffs' claimed structural deprivation of constitutional
rights.
Appellants' Br. at 3 (citing Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20). This selective quote, like others Plaintiffs
rely upon throughout their brief, ignores an important portion of the Court's decision. What this
Court actually said is this:
Alleging systemic inadequacies in a public defense system results in actual or
constructive denials of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution suffices to
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show an injury in fact to establish standing m a suit for deprivation of
constitutional rights.

Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20 (emphasis added).
It is readily apparent why Plaintiffs omitted the emphasized portion of this Court's
opinion. They omitted it because it does not fit the narrative Plaintiffs are now trying to use to
support their new, relaxed standard, which this Court has already rejected. Plaintiffs had standing
to pursue this lawsuit based on allegations that tie the existence of systemic inadequacies to real
constitutional violations as defined by Cronic. Standing was not, and cannot be, based solely on
the allegation that Idaho's public defense system is structurally unsound without any underlying
injury. That is not the harm this Court defined as justiciable in this case, and it is insufficient to
satisfy Cronic. Plaintiffs' allegations of harm should be adhered to for purposes of trial.
Further, Plaintiffs' position ignores the fact that this Court has already rejected the
"relaxed standing" argument that reduces their burden of proving actual harm. And Plaintiffs'
brief appears to assert that once class certification occurred their obligation to prove the alleged
harm somehow satisfies standing ad infinitum. Appellants' Br. at 2 ("[O]nce a class is certified,
as it has been in this case, Plaintiffs need not establish actual harm to each individual class
member, or even some subset of individual class members, to obtain prospective relief.") 19
However:
[w]e disagree [that "relaxed standing" applies]. Though violations of the right to
counsel constitute significant and distinct constitutional violations, Appellants are
not the only ones who could bring this lawsuit. In fact, the complaint alleges 'the
circumstances surrounding the named Plaintiffs' representation are not unique to
them. Rather, they exemplify the experiences of thousands of indigent defendants

19

There is a distinction between proving harm to each individual class member and proving harm
to any member of the class.
20

across the State . . ." Because any one of those "thousands of indigent
defendants" could bring this lawsuit, Appellants do not satisfy the relaxed
standing analysis.
Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 26-27 (emphasis added).
There is no change in circumstance that would warrant revisiting whether relaxed standing
applies in this case. There is nothing in the Court's prior decision or Plaintiffs' allegations that
relieves Plaintiffs of demonstrating actual and ongoing harm. If, as Plaintiffs allege, "[ e]very
day, hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who are unable to afford an attorney ... depend on
the State of Idaho to provide them with effective legal representation," and the State is violating
their constitutional rights, surely there would be plenty of evidence that Plaintiffs could use to
establish that indigent defendants across the State are suffering an actual or constructive denial of
counsel because of the alleged structural deficiencies. Plaintiffs' argument that harm is presumed
because of the importance of this constitutional right is essentially asking this Court to reconsider
and to grant "relaxed standing" in this litigation. The Court should decline to do so, and to the
extent Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that any indigent defendant in Idaho is suffering ongoing and
current actual or constructive denial of counsel, the State and PDC question-as too should this
Court-whether Plaintiffs still have standing to continue to pursue this action. In re CSBRA, 165
Idaho 489 (2019) ("Standing is essential to justiciability. Therefore, it is an issue that may be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by this Court.")
5.

The State and the PDC Propose a Standard that Has Been Adopted in Other
Jurisdictions

No court has ever condemned a statewide public defense system and declared it
unconstitutional based on the mere showing that the system creates a risk that some indigent
defendants may not receive adequate representation.

In fact, virtually all courts that have

addressed systemic public defense claims have relied on allegations or proof of actual past or
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present harm. Some have explained that proof of widespread actual harm is necessary to justify
declaratory and injunctive relief. One such case has been relied on by Plaintiffs in both this and
the prior appeal: Duncan, 774 N.W.2d 89. In Duncan, the appellate court issued a lengthy opinion
holding that the plaintiffs stated a justiciable claim for a systemic, class action challenge to
Michigan's public defense system. The court explained, however, that:

criminal defendants do not sustain harm, for purposes of justiciability
analysis and the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel,
simply because of their status as indigent defendants with court-appointed
counsel subject to prosecutorial proceedings in a system with presumed
existing deficiencies.
Id. at 120 (emphasis added). Instead, the Duncan court held that the plaintiffs were required to
prove that actual harm was ongoing and widespread. They were required to:

show that instances of deficient performance and denial of counsel are
widespread and systemic and that they are caused by weaknesses and problems
in the court-appointed, indigent defense systems employed by the three
counties, which are attributable to and ultimately caused by defendants'
constitutional failures. If the aggregate of harm reaches such a level as to be
pervasive and persistent (widespread and systemic), the case is justiciable and
declaratory relief is appropriate, as well as injunctive relief to preclude future
harm and constitutional violations that can reasonably be deemed imminent in
light of the existing aggregate of harm.
Id. at 124 (emphasis added). The Duncan court noted that "Plaintiffs will no doubt have a heavy
burden to prove and establish their case .... "

Id.

"[P]laintiffs must show the existence of

widespread and systemic instances of actual or constructive denial of counsel and instances of
deficient performance by counsel, ... all causally connected to defendants' conduct." Id.
A New York appellate court deciding a similar case also explained that the proofrequired
to prevail in a systemic public defense challenge is actual harm, not merely a risk of hypothetical
harm:
Plaintiffs claim that their constitutional right to counsel, as well as that of all
other indigent criminal defendants in the counties, are being systemically
denied due to deficiencies in the public defense system. It follows that, in order
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to prove their claim, plaintiffs will be saddled with the enormous task of
establishing that deprivations of counsel to indigent defendants are not
simply isolated occurrences in the case of these 20 plaintiffs, but are a
common or routine happenstance in the counties.
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367,372 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).

Some courts have used a standard proposed by the U.S. Department of Justice to determine
systemic public defense claims for prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., Kuren v. Luzerne Cty.,
146 A.3d 715, 744 (Pa. 2016) (citingAmicus Brief for United States at p. 11). The proposed DOJ
standard for prospective injunctive relief, like the standard the State and PDC propose here,
requires proof of actual harm (which the DOJ calls an absence of "traditional markers of
representation") caused by systemic deficiencies (which the DOJ calls "substantial structural
limitations").
The Kuren court held that to prove a claim "for prospective injunctive relief based upon
the constructive denial of counsel," plaintiffs must establish the likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury by focusing on the DOJ' s proposed standard:
(1) when, on a system-wide basis, the traditional markers ofrepresentationsuch as timely and confidential consultation with clients,20 appropriate
investigation, 21 and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's
case-are absent or significantly compromised; and (2) when substantial
structural limitations-such as a severe lack of resources, unreasonably high
workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender offices-cause that
absence or limitation on representation.
Id.

(footnotes added).

Put another way, under the DOJ standard, the "totality of the

circumstances" must demonstrate "a 'system-wide problem of nonrepresentation."' Id. at 731

20

Proof of the claim does not include the "risk" that attorneys might not consult with clients.
Proof of the claim does not include the "risk" that attorneys might not engage in appropriate
investigation.

21
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(quoting DOJ Amicus Brief). The court also noted that the plaintiffs burden is "a weighty one."
Id. at 745.
Kuren was a class action lawsuit brought by a county public defender who alleged his

office was unable to adequately represent all indigent defendants due to inadequate funding and
depleted resources. See id. at 720. The plaintiffs alleged past and present circumstances that they
contended established constructive denial of counsel. See Id. at 730. Plaintiffs here have cited
several other cases brought by public defenders, in which the public defenders themselves
admitted they were unable to provide adequate representation. Pub. Defender v. State, 115 So.3d
261 (Fla. 2013); Simmons v. State Pub. Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69 (Iowa 2010). These cases stand
in stark contrast to this case, where more than 20 public defenders from across the State of Idaho
came forward to unanimously refute Plaintiffs' claims. 22
Plaintiffs rely most heavily on Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988). Luckey
reversed a lower court's dismissal of a claim for prospective injunctive relief regarding Georgia's
public defense system. Plaintiffs contend that Luckey held that a plaintiff challenging a public
defense system need not prove any past or present actual harm. Luckey does not say that. The
court did quote a general standard for prospective injunctive relief: "likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury." Id. at 1017 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502
(1974)). But it quoted this standard to distinguish the district court's decision that a plaintiff must
prove that it is inevitable that all class members' rights will be violated, not to determine all the
elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed on the merits. Luckey, 860 F .2d at 1017 ("We cannot
agree that appellants' burden in this action for injunctive relief was to establish that ineffective

22

Contrasted with the zero public defender testimony provided by Plaintiffs in support of their
claims.
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assistance was inevitable for each of the class members."). In fact, the court noted that the
plaintiffs had alleged current harms, not merely the risk of future harm. Those harms are similar
to the harms alleged by Plaintiffs in this case, and included alleged delays in the appointment of
counsel, attorneys being denied investigative and expert resources, and courts pressuring
attorneys to hurry to trial or accept guilty pleas. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1018. But the Luckey court
made clear that it was not "passing on the merits of these allegations." Id. Luckey never made it
to the merits stage. Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of claims
on abstention grounds).
Luckey was different from this case in another important respect: the Luckey plaintiffs did

not seek any declaratory relief. See Luckey, 976 F.2d at 676 (summarizing reliefrequested, which
was limited to injunctive relief). Plaintiffs in this case, in contrast, have sought a declaratory
judgment determining that "the constitutional rights of Idaho's indigent defendants are being
violated by the State on an ongoing basis." R. at 205, Relief Requested ,-r C (emphasis added).

This request for relief necessarily requires proof of class-wide, present and actual harm in the
form of actual or constructive denial of counsel - not merely a risk of future harm.
Cases that have relied on Luckey have not adopted Plaintiffs' extreme interpretation of
that case-i.e., that all plaintiffs are relieved from the burden of proving ongoing, actual harm.
Instead, those cases have made clear that proof of past and present actual harm is necessary to
establish "substantial and immediate" harm. An unquantified "risk" of future harm alone is not
sufficient. Like this case, both Duncan and Hurrell-Harring involved claims for declaratory relief
as well as injunctive relief. See Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 100; Hurrell-Harring, 914 N.Y.S.2d at
369. Both cited Luckey, but also required significant proof of current, actual harm to justify relief.
This Court should require the same level of proof.
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Wilbur v. Mt. Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013), is the rare systemic Sixth

Amendment challenge that went all the way through trial. The Wilbur court's opinion provides
a good example of the detailed proof and egregious circumstances necessary to prove a systemic
right to counsel violation. The court based its decision on proof of ongoing, actual harm violating
the Cronic standards. See Id. at 1131-32 (applying Cronic to conclude system had constructively
denied indigent defendants' right to counsel). The court's findings demonstrate the relevant
evidence it found probative to reach the conclusion that the system had resulted in actual, Cronicbased harm.
The Wilbur court relied, in part, on individual attorneys' crushing caseloads (which
exceeded 1,000 cases per year at times), but it did not stop there. It carefully examined the
working conditions of the public defenders in the challenged jurisdictions, as well as the details
of the work they did on individual criminal cases. It examined individual case files to determine
that attorneys were conducting no legal analysis or research. Id. at 1128. It considered evidence
of attorney practices to determine: that one attorney "spoke to only three or four witnesses in the
whole of 2012," Id.; that attorneys "filed only one pre-trial motion" in 2012, id.; that attorneys
failed to conduct investigations, Id. at 1124; and that "[a]dversarial testing of the government's
case was so infrequent that it was virtually a non-factor." Id. Based on a detailed review of the
actual conditions and cases in the challenged jurisdictions, the court concluded:
Plaintiffs have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that indigent
criminal defendants in Mount Vernon and Burlington are systematically
deprived of the assistance of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution and
that municipal policymakers have made deliberate choices regarding the
funding, contracting, and monitoring of the public defense system that directly
and predictably caused the deprivation.
Id.

The Wilbur model is consistent with the State and PDC's proposed standard. It requires

proof that the State and the PDC took or failed to take some action that created systemic
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deficiencies; and it requires proof that those deficiencies caused actual harm to the indigent
defendants in the challenged jurisdictions in the form of constructive denial of counsel as defined
in Cronic.
The Wilbur approach also makes sense. The right to counsel the Constitution guarantees
is a personal right, so the actual circumstances of the indigent defendants and the public defenders
handling their cases is the most probative evidence in determining whether constitutional rights
to counsel are being violated. Moreover, if the circumstances are bad enough to establish
widespread Cronic violations in the challenged jurisdictions, evidence of those violations should
be ample and easy to gather, because "hundreds, if not thousands" of indigent defendants are
suffering similar harms.
6.

Plaintiffs' "Analogous" Cases Do Not Relieve Them of Their Obligation to Prove
Actual Harm

Because cases analyzing systemic Sixth Amendment denial of the right to counsel claims
conflict with Plaintiffs' argument that they need not prove harm in the form of actual or
constructive denials of counsel, Plaintiffs cite a number of cases analyzing other types of claims.
See Appellants' Br. at 24-27. These cases do not support Plaintiffs' effort to avoid proving the

widespread denials of the right to counsel they alleged in this case. Instead, the "analogous" cases
analyze either distinguishable rights or rights protected by other provisions of the Constitution,
and many establish that proof of real harm is required to prevail on the merits.
Plaintiffs rely on this Court's decision in Idaho Schools for Equal Educational
Opportunity v. State, 142 Idaho 450 (2005) ("ISEEO V''). Plaintiffs argue that the ISEEO V

decision means that they need not prove any actual harm in this case. Plaintiffs' reliance on
ISEEO Vis misplaced. That case involved a constitutional provision explicitly requiring the

Idaho legislature to establish an adequate school "system." See Id. at 453 (quoting Idaho Const.,
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art. IX,§ 1) ("'it shall be the duty of the Legislature ofldaho, to establish and maintain a general,
uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools'") (emphasis added). Thus, it made
sense for the Court to focus on what the Constitution required, a "system," rather than whether
individual schools were providing a proper educational environment. In contrast, the Sixth
Amendment does not say that states must establish public defense systems. Instead, the right it
creates is a personal one, applicable to individual criminal defendants - the right to assistance of
counsel. The Sixth Amendment says that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Unlike the constitutional provision at issue in ISEEO
V, the Sixth Amendment says nothing about a "system." No Sixth Amendment violation occurs

unless the evidence establishes that the system is resulting in widespread actual and constructive
denials of the right to counsel.
Plaintiffs also rely on two Eighth Amendment cases, Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th
Cir. 2014), and Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). Again, Plaintiffs' reliance on these cases
is misplaced. Neither case addressed the Sixth Amendment. Both cases apply the standard for
Eighth Amendment claims laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan,
which identifies proof of a substantial risk of serious harm as one element of an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (finding that the Eighth Amendment is
violated if a prisoner could show (1) that a defendant had knowledge of a "substantial risk" of
serious physical injury, (2) that the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference to that risk,
and (3) that the defendant acted in a manner that falls below the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society).
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment are fundamentally different.
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They involve completely different elements and the contours of each have developed in
completely separate bodies of case law. A standard for a constitutional violation cannot be created
by selectively mixing and matching elements of different constitutional provisions. Only one
other case could be located where someone else attempted to convince a court to allow them to
selectively borrow from Parsons and Brown and create a new standard for a violation of a
different constitutional amendment; in that case, the Fourth Amendment. See Amador v. Baca,
No. CV-10-1649 SVW, 2014 WL 10044904 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014). The Amador court
rejected the idea and succinctly described it as "the equivalent of trying to put a square peg
through a round hole[.]" Id. at *4 (rejecting attempt to extend "risk ofharm" theory from Parsons,
Brown, and Devaughn to a Fourth Amendment claim).

None of the cases Plaintiffs claim alleviate their burden to prove harm actually stand for
the proposition that they claim. 23

23

Additionally, Plaintiffs cite to Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2d. Cir. 2001), B.K.
ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019), andMarkva v. Haveman, 168 F. Supp. 2d
695 (E.D. Mich. 2001), aff'd, 317 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2003), all of which have no application to
the Court's analysis here.
Benjamin, 264 F.3d 175 is a Sixth Amendment case challenging New York City jail
policies that interfered with pretrial detainees' rights to communicate with counsel. They suggest
that the court upheld an award of prospective injunctive relief "without requiring proof of actual
injury." Appellants' Br. at 27. But Plaintiffs have mischaracterized the court's holding and the
district court found actual harm caused by the challenged policies. 264 F.3d at 180.
Snyder, 922 F.3d 957 is a case that affirmed in part and vacated in part a class certification
decision. The court did discuss the plaintiffs' allegations that certain policies placed them at
substantial risk of harm in upholding portions of the class certification. See id. at 971. But it also
made clear that "class certification is not a decision on the merits, and the plaintiffs will only be
entitled to injunctive relief if such relief is necessary to redress the constitutional violations they
actually prove at trial." Id.

Finally, Markva, 168 F. Supp. 2d 695 is a case that granted injunctive relief only after it
determined that the plaintiffs established actual harm in the form of violations of several federal
Medicaid laws. See 168 F. Supp. 2d at 716; 317 F .3d at 551 ("In granting summary judgment to
29

7.

The Correct Standard Provides a Fair and Consistent Burden of Proof; Plaintiffs'
Standard Does Not

Plaintiffs propose a standard where they can simply say that there is "risk" based on
anecdotes and outdated data, but do not address the burden of the State and the PDC once that
has been "proven." In other words, Plaintiffs propose that their burden is to produce "the most
probative evidence" to demonstrate that "the State's policies and practices-which apply
statewide-create a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants." Appellants' Br. at 33. What
remains unanswered, is what happens then? Would Plaintiffs necessarily prevail, or would the
State and PDC be allowed to rebut Plaintiffs' case? If so, what would the State and PDC' s burden
be in order to rebut Plaintiffs' "most probative" statistical evidence? One possible answer is, the
burden would be to prove a negative-i.e., no actual or constructive denials of counsel. 24
However, Plaintiffs appear to argue that this evidence is irrelevant, so it also calls into question
if there is any evidence Plaintiffs believe that the State and PDC can bring forward to rebut
Plaintiffs' allegation of risk. Instead, it appears that Plaintiffs believe the burden should shift
between experts and their analysis of statistical data in order to argue whether that data
demonstrates "risk." Clearly, the respective burdens of the parties should not solely involve a
battle of the experts.

the plaintiffs, the district court held that the defendants' policy of using different methodologies
violated federal Medicaid law in three respects.").
None of these cases stand for the proposition that proof of harm/injury is unnecessary in
those cases or in this case.
24

The State and the PDC believe this would unfairly shift the burden to them. If actual and
constructive denials of counsel are occurring, Plaintiffs should be tasked with the burden of
demonstrating such occurrences with class members' testimony, rather than requiring the PDC
and the State to demonstrate that it is not happening. This also calls into question whether the
State and the PDC even have the ability to identify these issues without their attorneys invading
the attorney-client relationship with members of the Plaintiffs' class.
30

Now contrast the State and PDC's proposed standard, which provides a burden of proof
that can be easily and fairly applied and has been applied for over 35 years. Lower courts can,
and have been, reliably applying a standard requiring proof of Cronic violations for decades and
lower courts are well-equipped to determine whether facts support a finding of an actual or
constructive denial of counsel.
Courts are ill-suited to apply Plaintiffs' test and adjudicate whether alleged design flaws
in a government system create a risk that an indigent defendant's rights may be violated at some
unknown point in the future. All systems contain some risk that they may not perfectly serve
those they are intended to benefit. Further, if the Court were inclined to develop a test based on
unconstitutional risk, Cronic already outlines that test:
[B]ecause we presume that the lawyer is competent to provide the guiding hand
that the defendant needs, the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a
constitutional violation. There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to
prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is
unjustified.

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. Plaintiffs ask this Court to take Cronic 's presumption one step further
and create a presumption of a presumption-i. e., that Plaintiffs need not prove a Cronic violation,
merely a risk of one.
It is also unclear how a risky system could cause a constructive denial of counsel without
showing some form of an individual attorney's qualifications or performance in an indigent
defendant's case. The word "constructive" is defined as "[t]hat which has not the character
assigned to it in its own essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the way
in which it is regarded by a rule or policy oflaw[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 283 (5th ed. 1979).
A constructive denial of counsel is defined under Cronic and exists, not when counsel is actually
absent, but when there is a high likelihood that no competent attorney could provide
constitutionally adequate representation under the circumstances.
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This Court defined allegations of a constructive denial of counsel in Tucker I as follows:
(1) the inability to speak to an attorney during an initial appearance; (2) an attorney with a
caseload that prevents him/her from reviewing discovery, investigating allegations, and does not
effectively communicate with client and with no time or resources to prepare for trial, and s/he
pressures the client to plead guilty because of lack of time to prepare; 25 (3) an attorney who, for
lack of time, 26 has conducted no investigation with trial scheduled to start in ten days, has not
reviewed discovery materials or discussed trial strategy, and a client that pleads guilty in order to
be released from jail; (4) a client who requests meetings, but is unable to communicate with
attorney, in addition to the attorney not providing any discovery materials, and does not file any
substantive motions, but does file motions to continue the trial; and/or (5) an attorney that spent
less than 30-45 minutes with client during the course of the case, despite requests from client for
calls and meetings, and who is unable, due to his/her caseload, to investigate, review discovery,
or prepare strategy for case/trial. Tucker I, 162 Idaho at 20-21. All of these allegations take the
"risks" within the system and apply them to real-life examples related to perceived attorney
performance from the standpoint of the indigent defendant. 27 None of the allegations ignores the
impact on the class of individuals that appear to be represented within this litigation, in order to
favor the "risk."
Plaintiffs' test artificially divorces the inquiry from the personal right to counsel that the
Constitution protects, and instead focuses on something the Constitution says nothing about, i.e.,

25

This allegation was made "on information and belief." In other words, Plaintiffs' attorneys
have not independently verified whether the circumstances that created this "constructive denial
of counsel" is in fact true.
26
This allegation alone necessitates either attorney testimony that s/he lacked time or some other
evidence that they attorney did not have sufficient time to conduct an investigation in advance of
trial.
27
Or could be proven by indigent defense provider testimony.
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"systemic deficiencies within the system." Indeed, it would replace proof of whether it prevents
indigent defendants from receiving adequate representation with a battle of expert opinion
testimony about the best way to design public defense systems. Plaintiffs' test makes little sense
if the goal is to determine whether indigent defendants' constitutional rights to counsel are being
violated by systemic inadequacies. Plaintiffs' test also removes the burden of proving any actual
harm before proceeding with allegations of systemic inadequacies.
Which way is better to determine whether indigent defendants are receiving adequate
representation across the state: examining proof about whether public defenders in various
counties are subjecting cases to meaningful testing, as the federal court did in Wilbur, 989 F.
Supp. 2d 1122, or looking for potential flaws in the system and predicting, through expert
testimony, whether they present risks that might result in future constructive denials of counsel?
Plaintiffs' skewed focus would condemn systems that are delivering adequate representation, and
could fail to identify systems that are not providing adequate representation. Moreover, Plaintiffs'
one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for significant differences among counties in Idaho, and
the fact that different systems can better serve Idaho's diverse communities.
a.

Plaintiffs Should be Required to Prove that Class Members are Suffering
an Actual or Constructive Denial of Counsel Because of the "Systemic
Defects" They Claim in Order for that Those "Defects" to be a Part of This
Litigation28

In order for any of Plaintiffs' alleged defects to be considered a constitutionally significant
defect in Idaho's public defense system, class members must be suffering an actual or constructive
denial of counsel caused by that defect. For example, Plaintiffs have claimed that the system fails
to ensure representation at many initial appearances in Idaho. At summary judgment, the State

28

In other words, Plaintiffs should have to prove causation.
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and PDC brought forward evidence that between 3 8 and 41 counties had an attorney at every incustody29 initial appearance. 30 The counties where the PDC could not confirm attorney presence
at in-custody initial appearances were: Benewah, Lemhi, Bear Lake, Franklin, Caribou and Butte.
R. 2643-2644.

The PDC does not concede that this always resulted in an attorney not being

present for in-custody initial appearances in those counties, but merely that it could not be
confirmed that an attorney is guaranteed to be present at all in-custody initial appearances given
the rural nature and low crime rates of those counties. While Plaintiffs spend a great deal of time
arguing that this results in an actual denial of counsel, unless Plaintiffs have class members that
went unrepresented at their in-custody initial appearance in one of those counties, the issue of incustody initial appearances should no longer be at issue in this litigation. This is because there is
a clear difference between the PDC being able to guarantee and confirm that an attorney will be
present at all in-custody initial appearances and the absence of an attorney at an initial appearance,
which results in an actual denial of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings.
b.

Not All Counties in Idaho Are Going to Have Class Members Suffering
Any Harm From the Alleged "Systemic Defects" and Those Counties
Should be Excluded From this Litigation Absent Some Level of Class
Representation Within that County

Idaho has 42 different county-run systems, 31 which vary from the biggest population
base-Ada County-to the smallest-Clark County. Each county has its own unique hurdles,
problems, issues, and personalities. Therefore, allegations about the public defense "system" in
Idaho make little sense without a thorough examination of the unique county systems and whether

29 The State and PDC do not believe that there is a constitutional right to an attorney at an out-ofcustody initial appearance. R. 2575-78.
30
As of the date of this brief, 43 counties have an attorney present at initial appearances.
(Appendix 2 at 6).
31
Four ofldaho's 44 counties have joint county systems. See Idaho Code § 19-862A(3); R. at
3920.
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those counties have any indigent defendants suffering a harm from any alleged "systemic defect."
If no harm is suffered within a county from any of the "systemic defects," then that county should

not be a part of this litigation. 32 In tum, Plaintiffs' inability to demonstrate systemic deficiencies
county by county should be, appropriately, fatal to their allegations of statewide systemic harm.
Such a burden is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996). In Lewis, the plaintiffs represented a statewide class of inmates in Arizona's
prison system. The system included many different prisons. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
an injunction entered against the entire system, because the plaintiffs were able to prove only two
isolated instances of violations. "These two instances were a patently inadequate basis for a
conclusion of systemwide violation and imposition of systemwide relief." Id. at 359. The Court
noted that "unless it was established that violations with respect to that class occurred in all
institutions of Arizona's system, there was no basis for a remedial decree imposed upon all those
institutions." Id. at 360 n.7.
In this case, requiring proof that widespread Cronic violations are occurring in each
unique county-run system ensures that systems where no systemic violations are occurring are
not unfairly condemned as violating constitutional rights, and are not burdened by complying
with an unnecessary injunctive relief order.
By way of example, consider a small, rural Idaho county: Camas County, which had only
eight misdemeanors in fiscal year 2018. R. at 3583. The Camas County commissioners hired a
contract attorney and paid him a fixed monthly amount, not including expert and investigative
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While the State and PDC understand that the class certification is not currently on appeal, it is
difficult to discuss standards and burdens without talking about the scope of the class and
providing guidance to the district court on remand since Plaintiffs rely on the scope and
certification of the class as one of the arguments for their proposed standard. See Appellant's Br.
33-35.
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costs, to handle all indigent defense. R. at 3583. Assume that the commissioners have no
expertise in criminal law, that the contract contains no specific provisions requiring the attorney
to be at first appearances, nor to have particular training, nor specifying how the attorney gets
money for investigators or experts, nor regarding supervision of the attorney's work. However,
the contract's fixed monthly amount makes sense in Camas County given the low and
unpredictable crime rate in the county and ensures that the contract is lucrative to an attorney in
a county where consistent work is not guaranteed. 33 Under Plaintiffs' standard, Plaintiffs and
their expert say this system is deficient and creates a substantial risk that indigent defendants will
not be adequately served, and the State's entire system, including Camas County's system, should
be declared wholly unconstitutional.
If Plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate any proof of actual harm under their test, and

the State and the PDC cannot put on the "the most probative evidence" of attorney testimony,
then the district court will not hear the reality in Camas County, which is as follows: that the
commissioners hired an experienced, responsible attorney who is well-versed in criminal defense,

see R. at 3582-85; that the attorney keeps up to date on CLE requirements both for the PDC and
the Idaho State Bar, R. at 3585; that the commissioners and the local prosecutor and judge behave
properly and do not try to interfere with the attorney's professional judgment, R. at 3584; that the
attorney's caseload, including his private cases, is very light and manageable, R. at 3583; that
few, if any, cases require significant investigation or expert assistance given the nature of the
county and the types of crimes charged, R. at 3 5 83; that when a case does require investigative
costs or an expert, the attorney is able to obtain funding, either directly from the commissioners,
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As opposed to an hourly rate, which may make the contract extremely unattractive to an
attorney in Camas County or a neighboring county.
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through Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2, or via the Extraordinary Litigation Fund, R. at 3584-85; and
that the attorney is present for all indigent defendant first appearances because the PDC rule
requires his attendance and he abides by that rule, R. at 3584-85.
Because Plaintiffs' risk test requires no proof of any real harm occurring through the actual
or constructive denial of counsel, the State's entire system, including Camas County's system,
would be subject to unfair risk of declaratory judgment that they are violating indigent defendants'
constitutional rights to counsel, even though that specific county "system" does not have any risks
and not a single indigent defendant has suffered actual or constructive denial of counsel because
of that system. Camas County would also be within the sweep of the injunction that requires it
to comply with standards that are demonstrably not an issue within that county. This is because
Plaintiffs' test requires no proof that the "risks" actually create harm, or that the rights the
Constitution protects are actually being violated.
Under the State and PDC's test, a class member must have suffered some harm-actual
or constructive denial of counsel-due to Plaintiffs' risks for the existence of the risks to be at
issue in this litigation. 34 Evidence and arguments related to counties should not be included in
the litigation, if the "risks" do not actually exist in that county. In other words, if no systemic
issues are arising in the specific county, that county should not be included within any order for
injunctive relief. While this litigation is not about the counties, it is about whether the State and
the PDC need to intervene in decisions that are purely ones of local control. If systemic "risks"
are simply discretionary issues of local control that present no actual harm, then there is no reason
for the State or PDC to intervene in that county's decision.

34

Harm, of course, arising from something other than attorney malpractice. There is a clear
distinction between harm from an attorney failing to do their job and harm from an attorney being
unable to effectively do their job.
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VI.
CONCLUSION

"There is no single 'cookie cutter' delivery model (staffed public defender office, assigned
counsel system, or contract defenders) that guarantees adequate representation. Rather there are
two primary factors that determine the adequacy of indigent defense services provided: (a) the
degree and sufficiency of state funding and structure, and (b) compliance with nationally
recognized standards of justice. So long as these two goals are met, Idaho policy-makers will
have remedied the crisis." NLADA Report, p. 89. The State and the PDC have achieved both
these goals through legislation and rulemaking adopting standards for defending attorneys, and
by appropriating tens of millions of dollars in State funding. This places Idaho's public defense
system beyond the analysis of statistical data and anecdote that was used in the NLADA report.
If Plaintiffs are going to continue to pursue this litigation, they should not be able to rely

on a research model that hypothesizes that the system might not work. Instead, they should be
required to prove that the system does not work. They should be required to prove what they
have alleged: that indigent defendants' constitutional rights are being violated across the state are
suffering actual or constructive denials of counsel. Nothing less can justify a determination that
the State and PDC are violating the constitutional rights of "hundreds, if not thousands" of
indigent defendants' constitutional rights in Idaho.
DATED this 20th day of February, 2020.
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CHRONOLOGY OF PUBLIC DEFENSE REFORM IN IDAHO

Proposal to study of Idaho's trial-level indigent defense system
• Contract with NLADA to conduct the study
• Public Defense Subcommittee (PDS) formed

2013

NLADA report, concluding that Idaho's public defense
delivery system is constitutionally inadequate

PDS made recommendations to the Legislature on public
defense system
H542 (2014) became law:
Created the Public Defense Commission (PDC) with powers and
duties: - Promulgate rules for (a) training and continuing legal
education for PDs; and (b) uniform data reporting (c) annually make
recommendations to the legislature, including: (a) core contract
requirements; (b) qualification standards for PDs;
(c) enforcement mechanisms; and (d) funding;
Banned "fixed-fee" contracts;

H147 (2013) - Changed definitions and created uniform
statewide indigent guide for court set to federal poverty rate
H148 (2013) - Revised provisions relating to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem
H1249 (2013) - Certain statements are inadmissible at
certain proceedings; established provisions relating to
representation and waiver of the right to counsel by certain
juveniles

Defined 4 ways to establish county system;
Removed two-year minimum term for county PDs; and
Disallowed private practice for county PDs

HCR26 (2013) - Formed Public Defense Reform Interim
Committee to study potential approaches to public
defense reform

H634 (2014) - General Fund appropriation of $300,000
for the PDC for FY 2015
HCR40 (2014) - Continued the Public Defense Reform Interim
Committee to study funding and enforcement mechanisms

H102, H104, H159, H161 , H195 (2015) became law, reclassifying
certain crimes as infractions
S1145 (2015) -Appropriated $304,300 to the Public Defense
Commission for FY 2016

H504 (2016) became law, greatly expanding
the PDC's rulemaking and enforcement authority
S1361 (2016) - Amended existing law to provide that money to
administer public defense may be
appropriated from justice fund and current expense fund

SCR 103 (2015) - Continued the Public Defense Reform Interim
Committee to study funding and enforcement mechanisms

JUNE -

Class action complaint for injunctive and declaratory
relief filed in the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho

H578 (2016) -Appropriates $314,100 for FY2017
H609 (2016) - Appropriates $5,482,800 for FY2017
and authorizes 4.5 full-time equivalent positions

2018
S1257 (2018) - adds two additional members to the PDC

S1021 (2017) - Appropriates money for BSU Workload study;
S1159 (2017) - Appropriates $5,827,700 for FY2018 and
authorizes six full-time equivalent positions
61.01 .01 - Rules Governing the Administration of Training
Funds for Defending Attorneys

S1258 (2018) - Add ELF grant for counties;
S1346 (2018) -Appropriates $5,804,800 for FY 2019;
61.01 .06 - Rules Governing Procedures for Oversight,
Implementation, Enforcement, and modification
of indigent defense standards

61.01 .04 - Rules Governing Procedures and Forms for
Indigent Defense Grant Applications
61.01 .07 - Rules Governing Standards of Defending Attorneys
and Principles of an Indigent Defense Delivery System

61.01 .07 - Amends Rules Governing Standards of Defending
Attorneys and Principles of an Indigent
Defense Delivery System
61.01 .08 - Rules Governing the Administration of Idaho's
Indigent Defense Delivery Systems

61.01 .08 - Amend Rules Governing the Administration of Idaho's
Indigent Defense Delivery System
61.01 .02 - Uniform Data Collection

FY2021 requested appropriation of $11,262,552
All rules reauthorized as temporary rules following 2019 session

61.01 .03 - Rules Governing Contracts Between Counties and
Private Attorneys

APPENDIX 2

Annual Legislative Report

January 2020

Executive Summary
Introduction

The Idaho State Public Defense Commission (PDC) Annual Legislative Report provides an overview of
the Commission's current work and recommendations to the Idaho Legislature for FY 2021. On behalf
of the PDC, we welcome your comments and look forward to the legislative session.
Proposed Legislation

The PDC proposed legislation to exempt certain confidential information from disclosure under the
Public Records Act.

The proposed legislation ensures the confidentiality of indigent defendants'

attorney work product and attorney-client privileged information and the confidentiality of information
about an attorney's fitness to represent indigent defendants. In short, the PDC's mission is to improve
the delivery of indigent defense services so that the safeguards of the 6th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Sect. 13 of the Idaho Constitution are met. Indigent defendants sometimes
misunderstand the PDC's role and as a result, send attorney work product and attorney-client privileged
information to the PDC believing the information will remain privileged. The privilege does not extend
to the PDC and because indigent defendants do not understand this, we must do everything we can to
ensure their constitutional rights are protected, which includes ensuring that their attorney work
product and attorney-client privileged information is confidential and is not public record. Additionally,
in performing its mission, the PDC evaluates attorneys' fitness to represent indigent defendants. This
is separate from the licensing and disciplining of attorneys handled by the Idaho State Bar. The PDC's
evaluation involves the review of information about attorneys from the subject attorney, their peers,
members of the judiciary and others. Open and honest input is critical to these evaluations and
individuals may be unwilling to provide input, and attorneys may be unwilling to seek qualification to
represent indigent defendants if the information they provide is not confidential and is public record.
Pending Rules

The rules changes that the PDC proposes this year are not substantive. The intent behind these
proposed changes is to simplify and clarify the rules and are limited to the deletion of redundant
information, word changes consistent with statutes, definitions consolidated into one chapter, and
removal of the word "shall" where it was unnecessary.
FY 2021 Budget

The PDC thanks the Idaho Legislature for the FY 2020 budget allocation to hire a senior research analyst,
implement workload limits for defending attorneys, continue to assist counties in complying with the
indigent defense standards and improving trial-level indigent defense services throughout Idaho.
For FY 2021, the PDC requests a maintenance budget with the flexibility to move funds within the budget
to meet the 2% base reduction. The requested flexibility is three-fold including 1) transfers from
operating to personnel; 2) transfers within trustee and benefits between joint financial assistance and
formula/workload financial assistance; and 3) flexibility for the PDC to determine from which accounts
2

the 2% reversion will be taken. If the reductions are across the board, the resulting $13,000 reduction
in funds for personnel costs (PC) and $5,148 (of which $2500 is for the training of defending attorneys)
reduction in funds for operating expenses (OE) will make it difficult for this small agency to effectively
perform its mission.
Currently, the PDC operating budget is 2.22% (1.12% if training costs for defending attorneys are
subtracted) of the total budget. Our employees are implementing cost cuts such as reducing executive
travel, using rental cars rather than personal cars and efficient supply use. Rather than requesting
additional funds, the PDC is utilizing savings from cost cuts to update technology and to provide more
professional and relevant services to stakeholders.
Having an effective and dedicated workforce that efficiently uses resources is key to accomplishing the
agency's mission. During the past 14 months, four employees from the private sector and one from
the government have joined the remaining employees and together they have decades of relevant
experience. We now must work to retain employees and compete with the private sector and other
agencies to do so. As an example, the agency had to re-post the announcement for the analyst position
and increase the salary $5,000 over budget. Even with the salary increase, the salary for that position
remains significantly below what other agencies are paying analysts with less experience.
Training for Defending Attorneys & Scholarships

The Idaho Legislature has appropriated funds each fiscal year for the PDC to provide relevant training
to defending attorneys. With counties budgeting some training funds, the PDC can use its current
training budget tp develop programs requested by and developed for Idaho's defending attorneys. In
August 2019, the PDC hosted Idaho's first "bring your own case" training during which defending
attorneys confidentially assisted one another in case preparation. In FY 2020, the PDC will host a oneweek public defense school which will emphasize trial skills and client-centered defense training and
prepare Idaho attorneys to be leading instructors at the school in the coming years. The PDC also uses
training funds to provide scholarships for specialized and out-of-state seminars and to partner with local
organizations sponsoring criminal defense training.
Compliance and Support

The PDC staff is working to streamline the collection of data from counties and defending attorneys.
Our staff now includes an analyst who will focus on what data is needed and how to best collect and
analyze the data and an attorney who will lead efforts to simplify and clarify the rules, standards, and
policies and develop supportive and sustainable compliance protocols. We are listening to comments
by stakeholders and continue to refine forms and processes to reduce redundancies and eliminate
unnecessary questions or steps.
As standards continue to take effect, the PDC is dedicated to supporting counties and attorneys to
meet those standards. The Commission, staff, and stakeholders recognize the need to account for
the allocated funds and work collaboratively to ensure all standards are implemented to improve
trial-level indigent defense in Idaho.
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Annual Report
Agency Overview
The Public Defense Commission (PDC) was established in 2014 to improve the delivery of trial-level
indigent defense services in Idaho. The PDC strives to ensure that the safeguards of the 6th
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sect. 13 of the Idaho Constitution are met.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-859, each of Idaho's 44 counties shall provide for the representation of
indigent persons by either establishing an office of the public defender or contracting with an attorney
or law firm to provide such services.
Historically, each county has funded its own indigent defense services. Since 2016, the Idaho
Legislature has appropriated funds and the PDC disbursed those funds directly to Idaho counties as
Indigent Defense Financial Assistance. The purpose of the financial assistance is to assist counties in
meeting the indigent defense standards required by Idaho law.
The PDC administers pass-through funds to Idaho counties, collects relevant indigent defense data,
supports compliance with standards, and provides training to defense attorneys to achieve fair and
just representation of the accused.
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Commission

The Commission is comprised of 9 members selected as representatives of statutorily designated
institutions and organizations. The Governor appoints 6 members and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, President Pro Tern and Speaker of the House each appoint 1 member. The current Commissioners
are:
Chair Darrell Bolz, Former Idaho State Representative & University Extension Agent {Retired)

Commission Member from Idaho Juvenile Justice Commission since 2014 (Inaugural Member)
Appointed by the Governor (Term: July 2017 - June 2020)
Vice-Chair Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender

Commission Member from the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender since 2016
Appointed by the Governor (Term: July 2017 - June 2020)
Angela Barkell, Owyhee County Clerk

Commission Member from the Idaho Association of Counties since 2019
Appointed by the Governor (Term: May 2019 - July 2020)
Commissioner Dan Dinning, Boundary County Board of Commissioners

Commission Member from the Idaho Association of Counties since 2018
Appointed by the Governor (Term: July 2018 - June 2021)
Jonathan Loschi, Ada County Public Defender's Office, Chief Criminal Deputy

Commission Member with experience as Defending Attorney since 2018
Appointed by the Governor (Term: July 2018 - June 2021)
Paige Nolta, Nolta Law Office, Founder, and Lead Attorney

Commission Member with experience as Defending Attorney since 2017
Appointed by the Governor (Term: July 2017 - June 2020)
The Honorable Linda Copple Trout, Idaho Supreme Court, Chief Justice {Retired)

Commission Member from the Idaho Supreme Court since 2016
Appointed by the Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court (Term: July 2018 - June 2020)
Senator Chuck Winder, Idaho State Senate, Majority Leader, and Grubb & Ellis, Director

Commission Member from the Idaho Senate since 2014 (Inaugural Member)
Appointed by President Pro Tempore (Term: February 2017 - February 2019)
Representative Melissa Wintrow, Idaho State House of Representatives

Commission Member from the Idaho House of Representatives since 2019
Appointed by the Speaker of the House (Term: January 2019 - November 2020)
During 2019, the Commission conducted its business in 13 PDC meetings and joined Idahoans in 7
negotiated rulemaking meetings around the state.
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Counties & Defending Attorneys
Institutional Offices

Fourteen counties now have institutional public defense offices that together employ almost 200
attorneys. Counties also contract with more than 200 other defending attorneys to provide primary
and conflict indigent defense services. Every county courthouse maintains confidential meeting space
for attorneys and their clients. Many counties are also now providing or improving confidential spaces
in offices and jails.

Forty-three counties are providing counsel at first appearances and have

implemented vertical representation of clients during their cases. Counties continue to use financial
assistance to utilize investigators, experts, evaluators, technology and support staff to comply with the
standards for indigent defense.
Financial Assistance

Financial assistance is awarded annually to eligible counties with more than 92% of the PDC allocation
passing through to counties to fund the following: 1) Indigent Defense Financial Assistance to meet
indigent defense standards and remedy any deficiencies; 2) Joint Financial Assistance for counties
within the same judicial district that establish a joint public defender office; and 3) Extraordinary
Litigation Funds for costs including expert witnesses, evidence testing and investigation (excluding
expenses associated with capital crimes). In the past four years, the Idaho Legislature has appropriated
almost $29,000,000 to the PDC to disburse to counties. In FY 2020, the PDC distributed $9,121,891 of
state funds to 43 counties to augment the costs of providing indigent defense. From that total, the
PDC provided the following: $4,702,909 to counties based on the greater between 15% of a county's
local share or $25,000; $4,318,982 in workload compliance assistance for counties to hire an additional
34 defending attorneys, 11.5 staff and to retain defending attorneys; and $100,000 to four counties
($25,000 each) for establishing and maintaining joint public defender offices. (See Appendix A, p 7).
The PDC also distributes funds for extraordinary litigation needs. In FY 2019 the PDC received 32
applications for Extraordinary Litigation Funds (ELF), awarded $252,087 and disbursed $133,480 for
costs such as scientific evidence analysis or extensive investigation. Thus far in FY 2020, the PDC has
received 9 applications for Extraordinary Litigation Funds, awarded $28,250 and disbursed $13,820.
As the fiscal year continues, the PDC expects an increase in the number of ELF applications along with
invoices for services covered from awards made in past fiscal years.
Training

The PDC has a budget of $125,000 to train and provide scholarships for defending attorneys and the
State Appellate Public Defender's staff. From the FY 2020 training budget, the PDC will host four legal
education courses and provide both national and local webinars to our defending attorneys. To date,
$6,500 has been awarded in scholarships in FY 2020.
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Appendix A - FY2020 Indigent Defense Financial Assistance
Appendix A - FY2020 Indigent Defense Financial Assistance
County

Ada
Adams
Bannock
Bear Lake
Benewah
Bingham
Blaine
Boise
Bonner
Bonneville
Boundary
Butte
Camas
Canyon
Caribou
Cassia - Joint w/Minidoka
Clark - DID NOT APPLY
Clearwater
Custer
Elmore
Franklin
Fremont
Gem
Gooding
Idaho
Jefferson
Jerome
Kootenai
Latah
Lemhi
Lewis
Lincoln
Madison
Minidoka - Joint w/Cassia
Nez Perce
Oneida - Joint w/Power
Owyhee
Payette
Power - Joint w/Oneida
Shoshone
Teton
Twin Falls
Valley
Washington

FV2020 TOTALS

FV2020 Indigent

FV2020 Joint

Defense Financial

Financial

Assistance

Assistance

FV2020 Workload

FV2020 Total Financial

Compliance Award

Assistance

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,347,568.20
25,000.00
222,698.70
25,000.00
25,000.00
57,145.46
58,392.43
25,000.00
152,871.17
199,788.85
25,000.00
25,000.00
20,000.00
542,646.09
25,000.00
70,882.69

25,000.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
25,000.00 $
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
25,000.00 $
$
25,000.00 $
$
$
25,000.00 $
$
$
$
$
$

$

4,702,909.20

$ 100,000.00 $

-

$
$

33,081.75
25,000.00
106,139.24
25,000.00
25,000.00
30,014.02
60,702.19
29,720.40
25,000.00
78,439.80
531,629.87
65,973.40
25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
53,132.10

$

143,974.11
25,000.00

$

25,000.00
65,346.03
25,000.00

$

38,787.75
25,000.00
253,633.65
40,341.30
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1,347,568.20
47,800.00
1,352,748.70
46,900.00
25,000.00
173,395.46
83,392.43
35,000.00
302,490.81
678,478.91
25,000.00
48,000.00
20,360.00
655,877.09
35,000.00
212,922.13

21,500.00

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

4,318,982.67

$

9,121,891.87

-

22,800.00
1,130,050.00
21,900.00
-

116,250.00
25,000.00
10,000.00
149,619.64
478,690.06
-

23,000.00
360.00
113,231.00
10,000.00
117,039.44
-

5,000.00
20,000.00
24,250.00
2,566.00
10,000.00
49,544.00
77,836.79
-

5,000.00
-

1,039,938.00
12,600.00
-

200,000.00
-

50,000.00
148,200.00
38,278.61
-

368,849.13
27,480.00

-

38,081.75
45,000.00
130,389.24
27,566.00
35,000.00
79,558.02
138,538.98
29,720.40
30,000.00
78,439.80
1,571,567.87
78,573.40
25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
78,132.10
343,974.11
50,000.00
75,000.00
213,546.03
88,278.61
38,787.75
25,000.00
622,482.78
67,821.30
46,500.00

Appendix B - FV2019/2020 Budget & Expenditures
_ _ _ _ _ _ _FV2020 Detailed Expenditures
[A]

[B]

[C]

[D]

FY 2019

[E]

[F]

FY 2020
Possible

Salary & Benefits
Communication Costs
Employee Development
General Services
Professional Services
Repair & Ma int Svcs
Administrative Services
Computer Services
Employee Travel Costs
Administrative Supplies
Fuel & Lubricants Costs
MFG & Merch Costs
Computer Supplies
Repair & Ma int Supplies
Inst & Resident Supplies
Specific Use Supplies
Insurance
Utility Charges
Rentals & Oper Leases
Misc Expenditures

Actual

Legislative

Actual Expenses

Total Adjusted

Remaining

Expenditures

Appropriations

Thru Nov

Expenditures

Monies

516,844

649,800

210,106

594,533

7,623
6,167
48,508
9,393
537
2,806
7,233
38,628
2,242

7,680
6,065
47,100
10,000
600
2,784
7,100
39,000
2,280

1,978
1,642
2,150
5,004
1,538
686
11,176
7,560
724

6,458
7,242
44,850
12,504
1,888
2,310
11,176
33,560
2,054

1,222
(1,177)
2,250
(2,504)
(1,288)
474
(4,076)
5,440
226

-

-

-

-

-

608
25

600

411
38

189
(38)

-

-

-

61
38

55,267

-

-

855

900

1,664

1,664

-

-

-

-

-

38,973
81,041

39,376
79,500

18,358
17,562

39,144
61,062

232
18,438

244,639

257,400

70,142

224,362

33,038

4,363

5,100

0

0

5,100

4,682,199

10,818,888

9,135,711

10,767,500

51,388

10,012,600

9,021,892

9,021,892

990,708

150,000

100,000

100,000

50,000

Funds

423,100

13,820

423,100

-

Total

11,731,188

Total Operating Costs

Capital Outlay
Trustee & Benefit Payments
ID Grant Awards
Merger Incentive

(764)

Tech Assist/Extraordinary Litigation
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11,586,395

144,794

Appendix C - Public Defense Act & Administrative Rules
Pursuant to Idaho Code §19-8S0(a), the PDC shall promulgate rules establishing the following:
•

Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attorneys;

•

Uniform data reporting requirements and model forms for annual reports;

•

Model contracts and core requirements for contracts between counties and private attorneys

•

Procedures and forms by which counties may apply for funds to be used to bring their delivery of
indigent defense services in compliance with applicable standards;

•

Procedures for Administrative review and fair hearings;

•

Procedures for oversight, implementation, enforcement and modification of indigent defense
standards; and

•

Standards for defending attorneys that utilize the following principles:
1.

The delivery of indigent defense services should be independent of political and
judicial influence.

2.

Defending attorneys should have sufficient time and private physical space to
safeguard client confidentiality.

3.

Defending attorneys' workloads should permit effective representation.

4.

Avoidance of economic incentives/disincentives that impair effective representation.

s.

Defending attorneys' abilities, training, and experience should match the nature and
complexity of cases.

6.

The assigned defending attorney should continuously oversee the representation of
that case and appear at every substantive court hearing.

7.

There should be reasonable equity between defending attorneys and prosecuting
attorneys with respect to resources, staff, and facilities.

s.

Defending attorneys should obtain continuing legal education relevant to their
indigent defense cases.

9.

Defending attorneys should be reviewed and supervised for compliance with
indigent defense standards.

10.

Defending attorneys should identify and resolve conflicts of interest.
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Staff

Executive Director - Kathleen J. Elliott
Nancy Hernandez - Program/Training Administrator

Aaron Freudenthal - Regional Coordinator

Mark LaSalle - Senior Research Analyst

Jared Ricks - Regional Coordinator

Clark Morgan - Administrative Assistant II

Tammy A. Zokan - Regional Coordinator

Offices
Boise
816 W. Bannock Street, Suite 201
Boise, Idaho 83702
208-332-1735
Blackfoot
490 N. Maple Street, Suite E
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221
208-520-6453
Moscow
111 N. Washington Street, Suite 6, Office 1
Moscow, Idaho 83843
208-892-9487

Website
www. pdc. ida ho.gov
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